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mAbstract: Several middle income countries are considering reforms to their
severance pay regulations to both increase flexibility for firms and better protect
workers. Policy discussions then often revolve around whether to adopt an
unemployment insurance (UI) scheme or unemployment individual savings accounts
(UISAs). Proponents of the first emphasize its ability to pool risks and introduce an
element of solidarity. Critics point to its potentially negative effects on labor supply
as individuals could have fewer incentives to seek, take or keep jobs. In this paper,
we show that UI and UISAs are, in fact, particular cases of a more general design and
that the crucial policy choice is in terms of how redistribution – to cover benefits for
those who could not save enough -- is financed. We outline key features of this
general design and identify trade-offs and possible solutions. We then discuss issues
related to implementation and show how recent technological developments
around biometric identification can facilitate the monitoring of conditionalities
related to participation in job-search and training activities.
JEL codes: O15, J64, H55
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Risk-pooling; Labor market transitions1 Introduction
As part of the objective of achieving more flexibility for employers while better
protecting workers, several countries have been considering the adoption (or reform)
of unemployment benefit systems. Policy discussions then often revolve around the
question of whether to adopt an unemployment insurance (UI) scheme or unemploy-
ment individual savings accounts (UISAs). Proponents of the first emphasize its ability
to pool risks and introduce an element of solidarity. Critics highlight its potentially
negative effects on labor supply as individuals would have fewer incentives to seek,
take or keep jobs. The evidence, which comes mainly from OECD countries, is in gen-
eral mixed.1 (There are various studies for high income countries showing that un-
employment spells and the unemployment rate tend to increase as the level of benefits
and/or their duration increases (see Ribe et al. 2012; chapter 5, Lalive 2008, or Lalive
et al. 2005). Chetty (2004, 2008) and Chetty and Looney (2006) reveal a welfare in-
creasing income effect of unemployment benefits which is particularly important in
the presence of inefficient private insurance markets and high risk aversion. ChettyRobalino and Weber; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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households, since unemployment benefits increase the opportunity for consumption
while unemployed. This, in turn, reduces the need for job search which leads to a sub-
stitution effect. If workers are unconstrained, this income effects is broadly not existing.
The substitution effect and the income effect have contrasting welfare implications (see
Chetty and Looney 2006). At the same time, more generous benefits can give workers
more flexibility to search for jobs and lead to better matches. Recent analysis for Euro-
pean countries confirm this argument Tatsiramos (2009).
Unemployment individual savings accounts have both, proponents and opposers. The
main advantage over UI which has been emphasized in the literature is that, because ben-
efits are financed out of individuals’ savings, workers have better incentives to seek and
take jobs (Robalino et al. 2009). Indeed, balances in the individual account can, under cer-
tain conditions, be used to finance investments such as education or the purchase of a
house, or to increase the pension’s value upon retirement. The main criticism, however, is
that in their pure form they do not provide enough protection to workers, particularly
low skilled workers who tend to have shorter contributions densities (and therefore lower
savings) and might have more frequent periods of unemployment. The fact that benefits
are often paid as a lump sum can also be problematic as there is a risk that workers over
consume and run out of savings before having found a job. In addition, since benefits are
financed only out of savings, contributions rates are usually high (e.g., 8 percent to finance
one month of unemployment benefits after 12 months of contributions) and this can re-
duce incentives to enroll or game the system. Below market interest rates on savings can
have the same effect, particularly when access to credit is constrained and individuals
cannot ‘dis-save’. In the case of Brazil, for instance, there is evidence of increases in turn-
over as workers try to cash-out part of the savings in their accounts (World Bank 2009).
In this paper we argue that UI and UISAs are, in fact, particular cases of a more general
design and that the key policy choice is in terms of how redistribution is financed. Indeed,
as in the case of UISAs, unemployment insurance programs also rely on some type of indi-
vidual accounting since it is necessary to track contributions (which condition eligibility for
benefits) as well as the payment of benefits (to assess when to terminate them). The essen-
tial difference between the two systems is that in the case of UI any positive balance in the
accounts is taxed at a 100 percent rate. It is the revenue from this implicit tax that is used
to subsidize the accounts with negative balances allowing the system to guarantee a certain
level of benefits during a given period of time, regardless of the level of individual contribu-
tions accumulated in the account. In the case of UISAs the savings in the accounts are not
taxed, but the level of protection is lower – many workers will only be able to finance a
couple of months of unemployment benefits. To address this problem, countries such as
Chile have created a ‘solidarity fund’ to top up the savings of the most vulnerable workers.
In the Chilean case, the solidarity fund is financed by a combination of pay-roll taxes and
general taxes. However, this is just one possible form of taxation. An alternative form
of UISA could tax savings instead and decrease the payroll tax. This might reduce the in-
centives to save and, thus, find or keep jobs but as long as the tax is below 100 percent the
incentives will be stronger than in the case of a pure UI system. We argue that making
these policy choices explicit opens a broader range of possibilities for the design and imple-
mentation of unemployment benefit programs in middle and low income countries;
designs that can create a better balance between incentives and protection.
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view of unemployment benefit arrangements around the world to set the context. The
section that follows introduces UI and UISAs as part of a more general design and
identifies the key policy parameters that need to be chosen to create a continuum be-
tween the two systems. A continuum along which incentives for work and levels of pro-
tection move in opposite directions. The next two sections focus on the design and
implementation of UB systems in middle and low income countries respectively. In
terms of design we provide guidelines to set the mandate of the system (benefits and
duration) and how to assess the tradeoffs between alternative mechanisms to finance
redistribution. Regarding implementation, the focus is on institutional arrangements to
manage the scheme; the types of conditionalities to pay benefits that need to be consid-
ered and enforcement mechanisms; and mechanisms to contract and pay providers of
services. The paper ends with a short summary of its main messages and policy
implications.
2 How do countries manage unemployment risks?
Similar to other insurance programs, unemployment benefit systems can either rely on
risk-pooling or savings arrangements. In traditional risk pooling arrangements, benefits
are not linked to individuals’ contributions; benefits can be financed by the contributions
of other members within the pool or a third party.2 The two types of risk-pooling arrange-
ments in the case of unemployment benefits are severance pay (where the employers
pools the risk and finances the scheme)3 and traditional unemployment insurance (where
workers contribute to a common pool or fund that then pays the benefits of those who
become unemployed). At the other extreme, in the case of unemployment individuals’
savings accounts (UISAs), workers self-insure based on their contributions and those of
their employers. As discussed below, most countries that rely on savings arrangement also
have a risk-pooling scheme either in the form of severance pay, a “solidary fund” that tops
up the savings of vulnerable workers, or like in the case of Brazil classic unemployment
insurance.
The most common income support systems for the unemployed are severance
pay and unemployment insurance. Around the world, out of 183 countries for
which data are available, 77 percent have severance pay and 42 percent unemploy-
ment insurance. Only a few countries, mainly in Latin America have adopted un-
employment individual savings accounts (UISA) with or without a solidarity
component. A minority of countries also has explicit redistributive arrangements
(unemployment assistance) to protect the unemployed. It is interesting to observe
that more than half of the countries have two or more unemployment benefit
schemes – particularly developed countries.
Low-income countries tend to have more generous4 severance pay systems (see
Figure 1). Indeed, while the average generosity of low income countries is highest
among all income groups, it also varies greatly and increases with GDP per capita.5
For example, Burundi and Togo have a low severance pay generosity of 1 and 1.6
respectively with a GDP per capita of 271 and 588 USD. In contrast, both, Ghana
and Zambia have a generosity value of 8.7 with a GDP per capita of 1,570 and 1,425
USD respectively for 2011. OECD countries, however, have a decreasing severance
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Graphs by Region
Figure 1 Severance Pay Generosity around the World. Source: Own calculations based on data from
World Bank (World Bank 2012, 2013).
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and 22,316. Canada, in contrast, has a generosity value of 0.7 with a GDP per capita
of 50,345 USD for 2011. Similarly, Ireland has a severance pay generosity of 0.6 with
a GDP per capita of 48,423USD for 2011. Overall, OECD countries with a higher
GDP per capita tend to have less generous systems.
The presence of UI is strongly related to the level of development. Around 77 percent
of the high income and 52 percent of the upper middle income countries feature UI. In
contrast, out of 32 low income countries only 6 provide UI. These are Kyrgyz Republic,
Liberia, Malawi, Nepal, Tajikistan, and Tanzania. Among the lower-middle income
countries, merely one fourth have an UI scheme. In Sub-Saharan Africa, only 4 coun-
tries have implemented UI. In Asia, the share of countries without UI is about 81
percent, whereas it is 52 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 75 percent
in the Middle East and North Africa Region.
The design of unemployment insurance systems varies widely around the world in
terms of the level and the duration of benefits as well as eligibility conditions. The
generosity of unemployment insurance6 and assistance depends on the country’s in-
come level. Once countries provide unemployment benefits, there is a significant
positive relationship between generosity and the country’s income level. The highest
average generosity can be found in OECD countries (around 50), followed by transi-
tion economies (around 10), and Middle East and North Africa (3), Asia (3), Latin
America and the Caribbean (1.8), and Africa (0.14). Countries with very high GDP
per capita such as Switzerland and Luxembourg also feature particularly high un-
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Graphs by Region
Figure 2 Unemployment Benefit Generosity around the World. Source: Data based on Holzmann et al.
(2011).
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as the Netherlands, Spain, France, and Sweden with generosity values of 71, 69, 67,
and 66 (see Figure 2). In contrast, (lower) income countries are much less generous
with values of around 6 (e.g. Georgia) to 20 (e.g. China) with some outliers. For
example the upper middle income country Turkey features a generosity value of
around 46.
Unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISA) are a more recent type of defined
contribution system. Compared to defined contribution pensions, UISAs can be funded
or pay-as-you-go.7 Most of the countries that have funded UISAs are in Latin America
(e.g., Chile or Argentina).8 Outside Latin America, Austria and Jordan are among the
few countries with individual savings accounts for the unemployed. The latter has










Figure 3 Contribution rates to UISA schemes. Source: Data based on Ribe et al. (2012).
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It is common to think that the main difference between UISAs and UI is that the
former is based on individual accounts (as the name indicates) while the latter relies
on a common pool. In practice, however, UI systems also require keeping track of
individual accounts that register the contributions made by employers and em-
ployees to the fund, and the benefits received in the case of unemployment. These
accounts, in fact, are needed for any well run social insurance program including
disability or old-age pensions. The main difference between the two systems is that
in the case of UI, the benefits paid are delinked from the value of the contributions
made, while in UISAs the total benefits received cannot exceed the balance in the
account.
Consequently, ‘pure’ UISAs accounts cannot be negative while accounts in traditional
UI often are. The system runs because accounts with a surplus (for example the
accounts of those who never become unemployed) finance accounts which have a
deficit. In other words, in practice, UI works because the accounts with a positive bal-
ance are taxed at a 100 percent rate. It is this tax that contributes to reduce incentives
to work. In addition, there is the subsidy received by those who were not able to con-
tribute enough to finance their benefits. The tax and subsidy are zero in the case of
UISAs and this is why the system generates better incentives.
To formalize these ideas, consider a system of N workers that can be grouped into I
homogenous groups. Normalizing N = 1, the size of each group is equal to their share,
si, in the total population of workers. Members of group i have the same level of human
capital and therefore wages wi as well as the same risk, 1ei, and duration, di of unemploy-






A government trying to offer unemployment benefits to these workers equal to a
fraction R of their wages, could set small insurance pools for each group. The actuari-
ally fair insurance premium αi for each group would need to be set in a way that, at
any point in time, expenditures are equal to revenues. We would have:




where the last expression can be interpreted as the expected cost of unemployment
benefits (the risk of unemployment 1ei times the value of the unemployment benefits).
The government can track the contributions and benefits received by each individual
in the pool. On average, over time, individuals would contribute αi * ei *wi
when employed and cost R * di *wi while unemployed. From equation (2), we know that
αi * ei = R * di. On average, therefore, individuals within each risk pool would have
accounts with zero balance. But, of course, at any point in time one would observe in-
dividuals with positive balances and individuals with negative balances. The positive
balances would compensate the negative balances within the risk pool. As nobody in
the pool would systematically be accumulating negative or positive balances, there are
no systematic subsidies (taxes) received (paid) by any individual within the group.
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and charge to each a fair insurance premium. Even if administratively and statistically
viable -- after all that is how car insurance works -- it would be politically difficult. As a
result governments implement unemployment insurance programs with a constant pre-
mium α , which is also calculated to equate expenditures with revenues across groups:
α ¼ R  ∑si  ui




where is u is the average unemployment rate of the group of N workers.
This time, individuals for whom α > αi are being taxed (i.e., are asked to pay a pre-
mium above the expected value of their unemployment benefits), in order to subsidize
individuals for whom α < αi As before, the government can track the balance in the in-
dividual accounts of each plan member. On average, this balance is given by:
Bi ¼ α  ei  wi−R  di  wi ð4Þ
From equation (2) above we see that individuals with α > αi would be accumulating, sys-
tematically, positive balances. These positive balances or savings, would be taxed at a 100
percent rate, to finance the negative balances of those individuals with α < αi. These are
the taxes on savings and the subsidies that can reduce incentives for job-search or at least
allow individuals to increase their reservation wage and wait for a job for longer.
What we see so far is that once a government fixes α and R, the difference between
classic unemployment insurance UI and unemployment savings accounts (UISAs) is
only in terms of how to finance the accounts that have negative balances. In UI the so-
lution is to tax savings (i.e., the balances not used to cover unemployment benefits). In
UISAs savings are not taxed and either the government mobilizes resources from other
types of taxes to finance negative balances or it defaults on R.
The key policy question therefore is not whether to adopt UI or UISAs but how to fi-
nance the redistribution within the system. There is no reason to believe that a tax on
savings is more efficient than other forms of taxes.
A first comparison is between a tax on savings and a tax on wages. Indeed, the gov-
ernment could fix α (the rate at which individuals save in individual accounts), indicate
that positive balances are not taxed, and then introduce a tax txw on wages for every
worker to finance the accounts with negative balances.
txw ¼ ∑Bj  sj
∑wi  si with j∈I : α < αj and i∈I ð5Þ
Over a given period individuals of any group i for which α + txw < αi would still receive
subsidies from the system, but in all cases the net level of subsidies would be lower. Indi-
viduals in groups with α < αi and α + txw > αi would lose their previous subsidy due to the
new tax txw. Individuals in groups with with α > αi who were taxed under the old regime
can now keep their savings. In net they receive:
Bi−txw  ei  wi
¼ α  ei  wi−R  di  wi−txw  ei  wi
¼ wi  ei  α−txwð Þ−R  dið Þ ð6Þ
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So as long at the new tax is below α − αi individuals within these groups i would be better
off. However, others with higher unemployment risks and higher αi may not benefit.
In essence there are three important thresholds for the distribution of αi : α + txw, α,
and α − txw . The various cases are presented below.
For α + txw < αi individuals continue to receive subsidies, the net amount is lower
due to the tax.
For α < αi < α + txw individuals were receiving subsidies before and are now paying
net taxes.
For α − txw < αi < α individuals are also worse off. Before they were losing the savings
they generated because they paid a contribution above their actuarially fair premium.
Now they can keep the savings but they have to pay a tax that represents a higher out-
let than the forgone savings.
For αi < α − txw individuals gain. They can keep their savings and the value of these
savings is higher than the value of the taxes that they now have to pay.
In summary, a 100 percent tax on savings in the case a traditional UI can be replaced
by an explicit tax on wages in the case of a pure UISA. Under the alternative financing
mechanism incentives for job-search are likely to improve, particularly among those
who have the potential to generate positive savings. Those benefiting the most from the
change would be workers with a lower risk of unemployment and low actuarially fair
premiums; most probably individuals with high levels of human capital. At the same
time the higher tax on wages for all workers, particularly those with low levels of hu-
man capital, could increase the tax-wedge and reduce incentives to take formal sector
jobs.
There are, however, other alternatives to the tax on wages that could be explored
such as consumption taxes or property taxes. There is some evidence, for instance, that
consumption taxes can mobilize the same amount of revenues as pay-roll taxes but
with lower levels of distortion in the labor market (see Bird and Smart 2013). In any
case, the analysis suggests that there are multiple ways to finance redistribution within
the unemployment insurance system and a tax on savings or a tax on wages are not ne-
cessarily the best options. Most likely, financing mechanisms will need to be defined on
a case by case basis to accommodate diverse objectives in terms of economic efficiency
and equity.
The virtue of this way of framing the design of an unemployment benefit system is
that it opens a continuum of choices, where classic UI and UISAs are only two particular
cases that define both ends of the continuum. Thus, given a targeted level of benefits,
there are multiple combinations of taxes on savings and other taxes (e.g., consumption,
income, pay-roll) that can achieve financial sustainability. As discussed in the next
section, these alternative financial mechanisms are likely to have different effects on the
behaviors of firms and workers. The aim then is to identify the combinations that achieve
the goal of providing a given level of income protection while minimizing distortions
in labor markets and the economy as a whole. These combinations, of course, will be
country specific.
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There are two fundamental policy choices when it comes to the design of a generic un-
employment benefit system. The first is the system‘s mandate, which is the level of bene-
fits or the replacement rate offered at different levels of income as well as their duration.
The second is the system's financing both the level of the contribution or savings rate and
the set of taxes to finance redistribution within the system. Then, depending on these pol-
icy choices, maximum limits on borrowing need to be set explicitly (by setting a max-
imum negative balance in the accounts) or implicitly (by having a minimum number of
contributions before being able to withdraw benefits).4.1 Defining the mandate of the system
The mandate of an UB system is characterized by four parameters: the replacement
rate, the duration of benefits, the minimum benefit, and the ceiling on covered earn-
ings. Clearly, there are no formulas or universal standards to set the value of these pa-
rameters; choices often reflect social preferences. There are, nonetheless, general
principles one can follow to ensure that the mandate is adequate and affordable.
4.1.1 Replacement rate and duration
As discussed in Section 2, worldwide, both replacement rates and durations vary con-
siderably. In general, the level of benefits offered is constrained by efficiency and
welfare considerations. In terms of efficiency, a high replacement rate implies high con-
tribution/savings rates and taxes (on savings or others). Mandatory precautionary
savings that are too high can reduce incentives to enroll and provide incentives to fake
dismissals (see Ribe et al. 2012; chapter 5). High taxes, in addition, can create multiple
distortions -- including reducing incentives to seek and take jobs when the tax on
savings is high. From the welfare side, on the other hand, the level of benefits should
be sufficient to allow workers to finance consumption and job search expenditures
while transiting between jobs. Depending on the tightness of the labor market and indi-
vidual characteristics, these transitions can take several months. In Brazil and Mexico,
for instance, male adults have lower transition rates out of non-employment and,
hence, longer non-employment durations than female adults. Age and education also play
a role with young workers having higher transition rates out of non-employment and,
consequently, shorter non-employment spells (even if higher unemployment risks), while
unskilled workers have lower transition rates, which implies longer spells (see Figure 4).
Probably, for the average worker, replacement rates would have to range between 50
and 70 percent of covered earnings while the duration ranges between 3 and 6 months.
For individuals facing longer unemployment spells or at risk of becoming long-term
unemployed other targeted interventions would be needed along with some form of
basic unemployment assistance.
4.1.2 Minimum benefit
Clearly, below a given income level, even a 70 percent replacement rate might not be
sufficient to maintain a basic level of consumption. Therefore, countries frequently
offer a minimum unemployment benefit. Similar to the case of the replacement rate,
around the world, there is a large variation in the level of this minimum. In Brazil, for
instance, the minimum unemployment benefit is equal to the minimum wage. In China,
Figure 4 Transitions of and Durations of Non-Employment. (A) Brazil. (B) Mexico. Source: Authors’
calculation based on PME (Brazil) and ENOE (Mexico).
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minimum living allowance. For example, the unemployed in the province Liaoning receive
70% of the local minimum wage if they have less than 10 years of contributions and 80%
otherwise Vodopivec and Tong (2008). In other countries, such as Spain, former contribu-
tors receive unemployment benefits based on a percentage of a legally defined
reference salary that increases with the number of dependents and decreases after a period
of time (e.g., six months). Spain complements this regulation with a minimum non-
contributory allowance for those who lost their eligibility and have an income that is
smaller or equal to 75 percent of the national minimum wage.
An important policy choice is how to anchor the minimum unemployment benefit. A
natural anchor would be the minimum wage. In theory, the minimum benefit would
need to be below the minimum wage so that low skilled workers have stronger incen-
tives to obtain jobs. The problem, in practice, is that the minimum wage is often sub-
ject to political discretion and can be set at levels that are ’too high’. (see Del Carpio
et al. 2012 for criteria to assess the level of the minimum wage). An alternative is to
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below 30 percent of this target – also a reference for the level of the minimum wage in
the literature. Clearly, this would require having an official indicator of this average.
4.1.3 Ceiling on covered earnings
The idea of the ceilings is to limit the mandate of the unemployment benefit system in
the case of high income individuals. The presumption is that high income individuals
have others sources of savings and/or insurance to manage unemployment and other
risks, and that any type of redistribution within the system should focus on low income
workers. A practice that has been proposed in the case of pensions is to cap covered
earnings at 2.5-3 times average earnings (across countries, a very small share of workers
has earnings above 3 times the average). This implies that individuals would only con-
tribute and replace income on earnings of up to 2.5 to 3.5 times the average. Earnings
above these levels would not be subject to mandatory contributions or savings.4.2 Financing arrangements
As discussed above the financing of a generic unemployment benefit system has two
components: an individual contribution or savings rate (part of which can be paid by
the employer); and taxes used to finance redistribution (i.e., pay for the accounts with
negative balances). Among the latter the options are: (i) a tax on savings; (ii) a pay-roll
tax (paid by the employer); (iii) a tax on wages earned (paid by the worker and not
linked to any benefit); and (iv) general revenues mobilized by other taxes.
4.2.1 The savings or contribution rate
For a given level of benefits, the value of the savings or contribution rate determines the
share of accounts with negative and positive balances (i.e., the share of beneficiaries who
receive subsidies) within a given time period, the total amount of subsidies that need to
be mobilized to cover the deficits, and the total amount of savings.
One principle could be to set a contribution rate that equates liabilities and savings.
This is the contribution rate that essentially equates, on average, current expenditures
with current revenues (see previous section). Having a higher contribution (or savings
rate) would generate too much mandatory savings (that in the case of a pure risk-pooling
system are taxed at 100 percent). Having a lower contribution rate, on the other hand,
would imply that general revenues (i.e., other things being equal higher taxes) are needed
to subsidize negative accounts, even if taxes on savings are set at 100 percent. The recom-
mendation therefore would be to truly treat the contribution rate as a savings rate, set it
at the point where a 100 percent tax on savings suffices to balance the system, and then
address the policy question of replacing part of this tax by other taxes.
4.2.2 Taxes on savings, consumption or labor
Knowing that at least part of the contributions that accumulate in the account can be
withdrawn after a given minimum of savings is attained, or added to the pension upon
retirement, can improve incentives to contribute and work. A precondition, of course,
would be to ensure that savings are remunerated at a competitive rate.
In the case of classic unemployment insurance schemes, the tax on savings could be
reduced by announcing to workers that part of the unemployment benefits they do not
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to ask workers to pay a percentage of their wages into a common pool, reducing each
month their take-home pay. What the system would be doing, implicitly, is reducing
present consumption to increase future savings. There are nonetheless various potential
problems with this strategy. First, many workers might not want to substitute con-
sumption for savings. Second, and more importantly, while the tax on wages would be
paid by all workers, long-term savings would mainly be accrued by those with more
stable jobs and longer contribution densities. The tax on wages could also reduce in-
centives to take formal jobs and, at the margin, could reduce labor supply.
Another alternative would be to finance redistribution out of pay-roll taxes or general
revenues. At least from the point of view of the labor market, general revenues would
be a better option, particularly if enough revenues can be mobilized without increasing
‘other taxes’ (see Lehmann and Muravyev 2011, Koettl and Weber 2012, Lehmann and
Murvyev (forthcoming)). In essence, as indicated in Section 2, after fixing the tax on
savings, any deficits of the unemployment benefit system would be covered through
general revenues. This would imply budget reallocations between programs and spend-
ing categories that can have general equilibrium economic and welfare effects. Clearly,
one would need to understand who are the winners and looser of such reallocations.
When there are evidently inefficient or regressive expenditures, however, cutting on
these to subsidize unemployment benefits could be welfare increasing.
If, at the extreme, no reallocation is possible, one alternative to the pay-roll tax would
be a consumption tax. The empirical evidence about the relative level of efficiency
of each of these taxes is limited. Recent studies suggest that at least in the case of econ-
omies with large informal sectors, a consumption tax is more efficient than a pay-roll
tax (see Bird and Smart 2013). The idea is that at any level of the pay-roll tax it is possible
to set a consumption tax that delivers the same level of real wages, economic activity, and
share of formal and informal sector jobs, but that generates more revenues. The corollary is
that the tax burden can be lower under a consumption tax. To avoid potentially regressive
effects one alternative would be to use consumption taxes on "high-end' goods or goods
with high negative externalities (e.g., cigarettes) and exempt items such as food. Other taxes
that could be considered include real state taxes or taxes on financial transactions.
4.3 Maximum limits on borrowing
In traditional unemployment insurance schemes the eligibility for benefits – and often
the level of benefits – depend on the number of months of contributions. In fact, there
is usually a minimum number of contributions that is needed, for instance six months,
to qualify for benefits. These eligibility conditions are ad-hoc since they do not establish
a transparent link between the contributions made by individuals and the benefits they
receive. Yet, they are introduced as a mechanism to control costs and abuse. It is un-
clear, however, that the rule makes a big difference. As an illustration, take the case of a
program that requires six months of contributions to be eligible for, say, 3 months of un-
employment benefits. With a contribution rate of 4 percent, under regular conditions, six
months of contributions would be just enough to finance one quarter of a month’s salary.
Implicitly, therefore, the UI system would be allowing borrowing for as much as 2.75
months of salaries. People in this situation, once re-employed, would regain eligibility for
benefits after a contribution period of six months. Those who become unemployed
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of salaries: 2.75 minus 0.25 resulting from the new contributions plus 3 more months of
benefits. So under this type of rule, individuals who contribute the minimum to receive
unemployment benefits and remain unemployed for the maximum period of time would
accumulate an ever growing ‘debt.’
An alternative within the proposed framework is to operate under the concept of a
maximum level of borrowing. For instance, workers would not be eligible for benefits if
their balance in the individual account is above six months of salaries. The rule would be
simpler and more transparent and, furthermore, would allow targeting individuals who
are facing more structural problems when it comes to finding jobs and require special as-
sistance. An additional rule to improve incentives is that above a given level of borrowing
the contribution rate can be increased temporarily to bring down the "debt" and/or that at
least part of the negative balance would be repaid at the time of retirement by reducing
the pension (as long as the pension does not fall below a given threshold).5 Implementation
Ultimately, the performance of any unemployment benefit system depends on imple-
mentation arrangements. One issue in the case of middle and low income countries is
whether sufficient institutional capacity exists to manage the system efficiently
Vodopivec (2004).12 In this section we argue that most countries can implement un-
employment benefits and provide guidelines at three levels: (i) the institutional arrange-
ment for program management and administration; (ii) conditionalities for benefit
eligibility and coordination with other programs; and (iii) contracting and payment sys-
tems with providers.5.1 Institutional arrangements for program management and administration
The institutional features and arrangements for unemployment compensation schemes
are often neglected in policy discussions. As Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) point
out, institutional details are often ignored in the literature. In particular, when applying
programs from OECD contexts to developing countries a careful analysis of the necessary
institutional prerequisites and arrangements is required. This is due to their diverging
institutional realities with very different initial settings in areas such as administrative
capacity, financial markets, as well as cultural factors.
One important policy choice is the institution which oversees the management of the
system. In many cases, it might be advantageous and cost effective to make use of an
institution that already deals with the relevant business processes. A natural candidate
is the institution in charge of managing the national pension system which should
already be handling tasks such as: identification, registration, collection of contribu-
tions, record keeping, authentication, enforcement, payment of benefits, and manage-
ment of funds. The unemployment benefit system could then piggy back on the
existing administrative processes.
Clearly, in many countries, the reality is that there are many problems with the adminis-
tration of the pension system. Many institutions, particularly in low income settings, have
not been able to keep proper records of contribution histories. At the same time, however,
several countries, including low income countries such as Bolivia, have been able to
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also numerous examples of innovations in the administration of safety nets, including in
low income settings. The implementation of conditional cash-transfers and public works
programs in Pakistan as well as in Ethiopia or non-contributory health insurance in India
are just three examples. We argue therefore that, if there is commitment, the introduction
of unemployment benefit systems could be accompanied by the necessary reforms in
terms of administrative systems.
Developing countries can also exploit recent advances in information and communi-
cation technologies to facilitate administrative tasks, including the enforcement of eligi-
bility conditions. A key element is the unique identification, authentication, and
tractability of beneficiaries and contributors. Recent technologies such biometric identi-
fication can greatly enhance the cost structure and lead to improved error, fraud, and
corruption prevention.13 For example, in India, the non-contributory health insurance
programs for the poor relies on biometric technologies (a smart card) to uniquely iden-
tify, authenticate, and monitor patients at much lower costs than standard approaches
Paik et al. (2010). These technologies can also be applied in unemployment benefit and
other income protection programs to identify, enroll, authenticate, pay, and monitor
eligibility requirements. Moreover, they can be used to keep track of the services pro-
vided by those managing active labor market programs and to implement reimburse-
ment arrangements based on results (see World Bank, forthcoming).
There are also efficiency gains that can be realized in areas such as reporting, pay-
ment of benefits, and collection of contributions. Computer and mobile applications
can allow program participants to access their accounts and balances and recent trans-
actions. Smart cards, debit cards, or mobile phone banking can in addition be used to
pay benefits and collect contributions, thereby reducing costs and increasing speed,
coverage, and transparency.14 By partially substituting bank services these technologies
can also help reduce fees.15
5.2 Defining and enforcing conditionalities and connecting people to jobs
The two core conditionalities that apply to most unemployment benefit systems are: (i)
not to be working; and (ii) to be actively searching for a job. In the case of middle and
low income countries, enforcing either one has proven difficult. The main challenge is
the high prevalence of informal jobs that renders traditional enforcement mechanisms
ineffective. An alternative approach, as outlined in Robalino et al. (2009b) would be to
eliminate this first condition and simply focus on ensuring that individuals receiving
unemployment benefits – particularly through redistributive arrangements – engage in
job search and activities to improve their employability. As discussed above, the emer-
gence of new ICTs, including biometric ID cards, can greatly facilitate this task.
Conditionalities can come in the form of ‘soft’ requirements such as to search for a
job or to participate in some kind of training, or in the form of ‘hard’ obligations as for
example workfare. In both cases, the conditionalities operate under the principle of
‘rights and obligations’ (or ‘mutual responsibilities’).
In the majority of middle income countries (MIC), public employment services (PES)
are pivotal for the implementation of soft requirements. These requirements may range
from the simple mandatory registration with the employment service to the develop-
ment of contracts that specify individual plans in terms of different activities and
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are well represented and play a major role in implementation, monitoring, and enforce-
ment. However, in many cases PES are poorly staffed and have an underdeveloped
administrative and management information system which constrains their ability to
effectively manage case loads and help individuals connect to jobs. The National Em-
ployment Office in Lebanon is a case in point (Robalino and Sayed, forthcoming). To
avoid this scenario, an alternative might be to outsource the provision of services and
enforcement of conditionalities, for example, by making use of a network of community
caseworkers Almeida et al. (2012).
A generic blueprint to enforce conditionalities and help the recipients of unemploy-
ment benefits to improve their employability and connect them to jobs has been de-
scribed in Ribe et al. (2012; chapter 5). The interface between the system and workers
would be employment offices that can be public or private. These offices would register
applications for unemployment benefits and communicate to the social security institu-
tion, which is then in charge of checking eligibility and computing benefits. The em-
ployment office would also be responsible for providing job-search assistance to
beneficiaries and connecting them to certified training providers. A biometric ID card
could then be used to monitor the number of hours the beneficiary spends in job-
search or training activities. Both the employment office and training providers would
weekly upload a report on services provided based on the transactions recorded by the
ID Card. The social security would then use to this information to authorize the trans-
fer of unemployment benefits to the beneficiary. For instance, transfers would only be
made if the beneficiary has completed 60 or more hours of training, counseling, and
job-search during the past three weeks. Key to the success of the system is, in this case,
the mechanism to contract and pay providers to ensure the incentives are aligned with
the objectives of the program.5.3 Service delivery and providers
Service delivery, and the selection, contracting and payment of service providers are key
issues when it comes to the implementation of unemployment benefits. In developed
countries, concerns about the performance of (public) employment services have resulted
in several reforms that introduced market mechanisms into the organization of employ-
ment services in recent years. Some of these reforms include budgeting linked to perform-
ance, management by objectives, decentralization, and the increased involvement of
private sector companies combined with competitive bidding (Heyes 2011; Weishaupt
2011). The actual employment services that have so far been widely used for sub-
contracting in developed economies are skills training programs and increasingly also job
search and placement support activities for the unemployed (Finn 2011; Thuy et al. 2001).
Sub-contracting entails the regular monitoring and evaluation of service providers
and the capacity to adjust service agreements to better respond to beneficiaries and
employers. Bidding procedures need to consider several dimensions, not only costs but
also quality requirements. Information systems can help tracking and monitoring the
performance of sub-contractors as well as labor market outcomes.
It is important to note, however, that the question of whether these additional man-
agement tasks needed for sub-contracting are justified and whether sub-contracting is
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results with positive impact evaluations in the United Kingdom and no results in
Germany, France, or Sweden. However, these evaluations have only been made in an
early stage of private service delivery. Implementing an effective sub-contracting system
for employment services is a learning process aimed at reaping the expected gains from
better incentives as well as more competition and choice. This becomes a challenge in
developing countries as the private sector supply of employment services might, at least
initially, not be sufficient or of high quality.
Public sector involvement might therefore be required at an initial stage. It might
take the form of a publicly funded service delivery platform with certain services being
sub-contracted depending on the readiness and advantages of private providers. Other
sensitive services such as the maintenance of a unified ID together with a centralized
database on beneficiaries and contributors would naturally be kept by the public au-
thorities. An example of a service that might be outsourced is the enrollment of benefi-
ciaries using enrollment kits that rely on biometric IDs. Here sub-contractors could be
equipped with portable enrollment kits that provide easy to use biometric identification
services to a vast network of sub-contractors.16 Clearly, this kind of arrangement also
needs to set appropriate incentives to maximize enrollment and define benchmarks to
assess the performance of the sub-contractors. Moreover, it needs to ensure trust and
minimize error, fraud, and corruption.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed general guidelines to design and implement (or reform)
unemployment benefit programs in developing countries. Our main proposition is that
the debate between risk-pooling (traditional insurance) vs. savings is misplaced. We
have shown that UI and UISAs are two sides of the same coin. In both cases, adminis-
trators need to keep track of contributions and benefits. The main difference is that the
savings that accumulate in some of the accounts in a UI program are used to cover the
accounts that have a negative balance (savings are taxed at a 100 percent rate). Clearly,
under an ’actuarially fair’ risk pooling arrangement, none of the accounts would sys-
tematically accumulate savings or be in deficit. But this is not the case with traditional
UI programs because plan members have different risk profiles. Given a level and
duration of benefits and the contributions rate, some accounts can systematically accu-
mulate savings (which are taxed) whereas others systematically run negative balances
(which receive subsidies). These taxes and subsidies can reduce incentives to search,
take, and keep jobs. At the other extreme, in the case of pure UISAs, savings are not
taxed and individual accounts cannot become negative which improves incentives for
job search. However, this also implies that workers are less protected against the risk of
unemployment.
We propose that countries take a more flexible approach to the design of unemploy-
ment benefits. The goal should be to find a better balance between efficiency and
workers protection. This is likely to be achieved by a ’hybrid’ between UI and UISAs.
The starting point would be to define the mandate of the program, that is the level of
benefits (replacement rate and minimum benefit) to be offered at different levels of in-
come and their duration (something that is not usually done in the case of UISAs
where the benefit can be a lump sum and if it is a monthly payment the duration is
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nance the deficits that accumulate in some of the accounts. We have shown that there
are four alternatives: (i) a pay-roll tax paid by employers; (ii) a tax on wages paid by
workers; (iii) a tax on accounts with positive balances; and (iv) general revenues. We
have argued that pay-roll taxes and taxes on wages can reduce formal employment
(the latter can also be regressive relative to a tax on savings). Relying only on general
revenues, on the other hand, can be considerably costly, while taxing savings at a 100
percent rate can reduce incentives to search and take jobs. The best option therefore
seems to be to rely on a combination of a tax on savings (below 100 percent) and
general revenues (e.g., revenues from a consumption tax, or a tax on wealth).
In terms of implementation the main messages of this paper can be summarized
as follows. Countries would need to rely on current pension institutions to manage
the unemployment benefit system, in order to avoid duplicating standard business
process – from registration and collection of contributions to the payments of bene-
fits. Clearly, in many cases, the administrative systems to manage pensions have de-
ficiencies but there is evidence that these can be addressed even in the case of low
income countries. The second message is that conditionalities to receive benefits
should be limited to the participation in job-search and training activities and not
include employment status – which is very difficult to enforce when there are large
informal sectors. New technologies such as smart cards with biometric identification
can be used to monitor these conditionalities. Finally, attention needs to be given to
contracting and payments systems for providers of job-search assistance and training
services (public or private). The goal is to give incentives to respond to the needs of
job-seekers and employers. This can be achieved by making payments based on ser-
vices provided (which can also be monitored based on the smart card) and results
in terms of placements.Endnotes
1 For a comprehensive overview of the extensive evidence see Vodopivec (2004). A
review of optimal unemployment insurance can be found for example in Karni (1999)
or, more recently, Shimer and Werning (2008).
2 In ‘actuarially’ fair risk pooling arrangements, plan members contribute a premium
that reflects the expected value of their benefits. In these systems there is no systematic
redistribution of income towards a group of plan members. Most social insurance pro-
grams, however, are not actuarially fair since they bring together members with differ-
ent risk profiles. In this case, there is a systematic redistribution of income from some
plan members to others and contributions are delinked from benefits.
3 Notice that the employer could as well transfer the risks to an insurance company
and pay a premium. Over a given period of time the present value of the premium and
the present value of the severance paid directly should be equivalent.
4 The generosity of severance pay is defined as the ratio of the number of weekly
wages paid per year of service (at 1, 5, and 10 years of service). An index value of larger
than 2 signifies that on average a worker with equal probability to be made redundant
after 1, 5 and 10 years of service would expect to receive more than 2 weeks of wage
for each year worked Holzmann et al. (2011). The generosity data was calculated based
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/12on the World Bank’s Doing Business Database on Employing Workers for 2013 (http://
doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/employing-workers).
5 GDP per capita in current USD based on the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators for the year 2011 (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD).
6 The generosity for unemployment benefits is defined as the replacement rate for
the average income worker. The data is taken from Holzmann et al. (2011).
7 See Robalino et al. (2009).
8 For a review and evaluation of UISA in Latin American countries, see chapter 5 in
Ribe et al. (2012).
9 The parameter ei can also be interpreted as the duration of the employment spell.
10 The proof of this is as follows:
The dynamics of the total number Ui of unemployed in group i is given by:
Ui;t ¼ Ui;t−1  1− 1di
 
þ Ai;t−1  1ei
where A is the stock of active workers from group i. In steady state Ui,t =Ui,t − 1 and
Ai,t = Ai,t − 1 so the equation above simplifies to:
Ui;t  1−1− 1di
 
¼ Ai;t  1ei
Or: Ui;tAi;t ¼ diei
⇔
ui;t  si  N
1−ui;t








11 See Brown et al. (2008).
12 Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006) provide a survey of theoretical and empirical
contributions on the effect of sanctions. Van der Berg et al. (2004) report significant
positive effects of sanctions. Lalive et al. (2005) also show significant quantitatively
similar threat effects arising from benefit sanctions on the sanctioned and non-
sanctioned. Van der Klaauw and van Ours (2010) show that the outflow from un-
employment doubles after sanctions have been imposed.
13 See for example the proceedings of the 2012 World Bank conference on
Implementing Social Programs: “Better Processes, Better Technology, Better Results”,
http://go.worldbank.org/C809DRFJI0.
14 An example would be the development of NADRA, Pakistan’s National Database
and Registration Authority).
15 Brazil is an interesting example in this context. Dataprev, Brazil’s technology and
information bureau of the Brazilian social welfare system not only substituted the ser-
vices and eliminated fees, but actually reversed the system and made the financial pro-
viders pay fees to the institution.
16 Portable enrollment kits are for example provided to sub-contractors of Aadhaar, India’s
biometric identification system used for the provision of government services and transfers.
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